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The China Currency Issue;
Why the World Trade Organization Would Fail to Provide the
United States with an Effective Remedy
Marcus Sohlberg

ABSTRACT
A critical issue in the global trading system that came to the forefront in 2010
concerns exchange rates. Having suffered to various degrees through the worst economic
and financial downturn since the Great Depression, many large trading nations have
sought to achieve economic recovery through export-led growth. In order to boost
international competitiveness, many have engaged in competitive devaluations, i.e.
interventions in currency markets to devalue domestic currency. According to Brazilian
Finance Minister Guido Mantega this situation has escalated into a “global currency
war”.
This paper focuses on China’s practice of maintaining an artificially undervalued
currency, and addresses the question of whether the United States could challenge this
practice in the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
answer is one of interpretation, but there is at least a tenuous legal basis pursuant to
which the United States could bring a formal complaint. The rationale for WTO
involvement is that an artificially undervalued exchange rate is a protectionist trade
policy because it is a combination of an import tariff and an export subsidy in the country
where it is maintained.

However, even if there is a legal foundation by which the United States could
lodge a formal complaint, it is the contention of this paper that WTO litigation would be
unsuitable. Drawing from the experience of past WTO case law, there is reason to believe
that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body would fail to provide the United States with an
effective remedy, seeing that the China currency issue is not a mere trade disagreement.
Rather, it involves the exercise of a sovereign prerogative that delves into complex issues
of social and economic structures in China. Therefore an adverse ruling compelling
China to refrain from its current practice is unlikely to be complied with. Moreover, a
case like this could also set a dangerous precedent for expansive interpretation of vague
WTO provisions, and considerably broaden the trade organization’s authority into
peripheral trade-related areas.
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Introduction
Why has not the United States filed a formal complaint with the World Trade
Organization (WTO) against China for obtaining an unfair trade advantage by virtue of
maintaining a significantly undervalued currency? After all, if one of the most critical
issues to the global trading system, and an alleged reason for the weak US economy, is
not litigated in the WTO, what does that tell us about the WTO dispute settlement system
and the WTO at large?
The rationale for WTO involvement is that an artificially undervalued exchange
rate is a protectionist trade policy because it is a combination of an import tariff and an
export subsidy in the country where it is maintained.1 Thus, is the fact that the United
States has not brought a WTO challenge indicative of the multilateral trade organization’s
demise from effectively adjudicating trade disputes between its member states? This
paper responds to the question in the negative. It is argued that the China currency issue
cannot conclusively be said to fall within the competence of the WTO and should
therefore not be resolved by way of dispute settlement. Litigation in the WTO of the issue
is both unsuitable as well as it would be fruitless, seeing that the dispute settlement
procedure would fail to provide an effective remedy.
Part I of this paper provides the context in which the China currency issue has
arisen, and explains why it is one of the most critical international trade issues as of late.
Part II examines the relationship between exchange rates and international trade, and
explains how the WTO fits into this picture. Part III offers an appraisal how the United
States could challenge China’s exchange rate policy in the WTO. Finally, Part IV

1

Arvind Subramanian, New PPP-based Estimates of Renminbi Undervaluation and Policy
Implications, Peterson Institute of International Economics, Policy Brief 10-08, p. 6
4

attempts to show potential adverse consequences of bringing a WTO case, and how,
ultimately, the WTO fails to provide an effective remedy to the issue.
Part I
Origins of the Dispute
The China currency issue is not a newfound issue for lawmakers in the United
States. Senator Charles Schumer (Democrat – New York), backed by Senator Lindsey
Graham (Republican – South Carolina), introduced the first proposal for unilateral
legislative action against the undervalued Chinese Renminbi2 (RMB) in 2003. A whole
host of unsuccessful congressional bills followed suit until September 29, 2010, when the
House of Representatives approved the “Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act” (H.R.
2378). The running theme of these bills is to instruct the U.S. Department of Commerce
to invoke trade remedies, in the form of countervailing duties, against Chinese imports in
the event the RMB is not revalued. 3 In other words, the legislation treats China’s
artificially lower-valued currency as an export subsidy and authorizes countervailing
duties to offset the amount of undervaluation. Broad political and industry pressure have
been the underlying forces of the legislative initiative; seeing that a seemingly
insurmountable unemployment rate and trade deficit is maintained in the United States.
With the effects of the financial and economic crisis still reverberating around the
world, many governments have decided that economic recovery shall be achieved
through export-led growth. President Obama has endorsed this line of thought by

2

China’s currency is interchangeably referred to as “Yuan” or “Renminbi”. The more formal term
“Renminbi” will be used in this paper; see Matt Phillips, Yuan or Renminbi: What’s the Right Word for
China’s Currency? WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jun. 21, 2010)
3
Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Claire Brunel, The U.S. Congress and the Chinese Renminbi, p. 222, in
Morris Goldstein & Nicolas R. Lardy (eds.), Debating China’s Exchange Rate Policy (2008)
5

promising to double U.S. exports over the next five years through, inter alia, government
trade promotion initiatives such as the National Export Initiative.4 One major obstacle for
the United States in attaining this goal is that many leading trading partners around the
globe are intervening in currency markets to drive down the price of their currencies in
order to boost export competitiveness, so called “competitive devaluation”. The value of
a country’s currency has, therefore, become an increasingly important consideration in
the fierce competition for world market shares. Brazilian Finance Minister, Mr. Guido
Mantega, has famously referred to these tactics as a “global currency war”.5
The fact that governments are engaging in competitive devaluations to determine
the value of their currencies, instead of having free floating market-determined exchange
rates that reflect underlying economic fundamentals, is not a new tool of economic
statecraft. For decades, it has been utilized by governments to affect their exportingindustries’ competiveness and generate domestic employment opportunities. Even the
United States, now on the receiving end of the currency exchange interventions, has
deployed tactics to achieve desired exchange rate movements in the dollar.6 Arguably the
latest of such tactics took place in 2010, by virtue of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s extensive
cash injections into the U.S. economy, by way of so called quantitative easing, which
contributed to a substantial easing of the dollar against other world currencies.7
As alluded to above, China is not the sole culprit in the “global currency war”. In
fact, several big trading nations and oil-exporting countries act proactively in driving the

4

United States Trade Representative, President Obama Lays Out Export Initiative To Create Jobs
(Jan. 28, 2010)
5
Jonathan Wheatley, Brazil in “Currency War” Alert, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 29, 2010)
6
U.S. Federal Reserve of New York, U.S. Foreign Exchange Intervention
7
William Cline & John Williamson, Currency Wars? Peterson Institute for International
Economics, November 2010, Policy Brief 10-26, p. 2
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price of their currencies down. 8 If China had merely been a medium-sized economic
power, its currency policy would most likely not have been the center of the United
States’ attention. But when China in fact is the world’s second largest economy, the
world’s largest exporter, and the world’s largest manufacturer, it occupies a systemically
significant role in the world economy. Its mercantilist currency policy, therefore, is one
that the United States cannot afford to sit back and passively accept.9 Hence reference to
the issue as the “China currency issue”.
Part II
Currency Exchange Rates and International Trade
Although complex to assess, there exist a clear linkage between currency exchange
rates and international trade. Strong currency stimulus in one country has the potential of
enhancing export opportunities for trading partners, because it increases private
purchasing power and consumption of domestic consumers while making national
exports more expensive. Conversely, a weak national exchange rate acts so as to
encourage a country’s exports while discouraging the inflow of imports.10
In the case of China, it has been suggested that the undervaluation of the RMB is
more than 20% in real effective terms and about 40% relative to the dollar. 11 The
continuous success of the People’s Bank of China (China’s central bank) in maintaining
an artificially undervalued RMB has the effect of stimulating Chinese exports by
8

For instance, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, see Peter Garnham, Currency
Race that Everyone is Trying to Lose, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 12, 2010); and oil-exporting countries,
such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, see Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind
Subramanian, infra note 40, pp. 1, 24
9
Gideon Rachman, China Can No Longer Plead Poverty, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 27, 2010)
10
Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, Currency Manipulation and World Trade, NBER Working
Paper 14600 (December 2008), p. 1
11
William Cline & John Williamson, 2009 Estimates of Fundamental Equilibrium Exchanges
Rates, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 09-10
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conferring an unfair price advantage to national exporters vis-à-vis foreign competitors.
While it, conversely, has the effect of weakening the purchasing power of Chinese
households, which effectively reduces consumption and importation of foreign goods. In
effect, it is a combination of an export subsidy and an import tariff.
This asymmetry between export/import trade flows is a major contributing factor to
China’s global current account surplus that amounts to US$270 billon of which the trade
surplus, for November 2010, accounted for US$22.9 billion.12 As professor Christoph
Herrmann, Professor at University of Oldenburg, Germany, explains:13
From the perspective of exchange rate theory, it is obvious that the [RMB] is manifestly
undervalued. Without the interventions of the People’s Bank of China, the massive
capital inflow and the record trade surplus could not persist at the same time, neither
theoretically nor practically. A floating exchange rate would appreciate until the point
where the balance of payments would be equalized, with the current account balance and
the capital and financial account balance outweighing each other.

The fact that one country is running a current account surplus naturally requires one
or more countries to maintain deficits. In the case of China’s surplus, the United States
finds itself on the receiving end. It is currently the world’s largest debtor, suffering from
a soaring current account deficit of US$466 billion. 14 The trade deficit, alone, was
US$38.7 billion in October 2010, which is a direct consequence of the disparity between
surging Chinese imports and weak U.S. exports.15 In a United States where there is high
unemployment and slow economic growth, there is a strong body of opinion that think
12

Financial Times, Imbalances Cloud 20/20 Vision, Nov. 10, 2010, p. 9; Alan Rappeport, Exports
Shrink US Trade Gap, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 10, 2010)
13
Christoph Herrmann, Don Yuan: China’s “Selfish” Exchange Rate Policy and International
Economic Law, p. 33, in C. Herrmann and J.P. Terhechte (eds.), European Yearbook of International
Economic Law (2010)
14
Geoff Dyer, China’s Trade Surplus Jumps in October, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 10, 2010)
15
United States Department of Commerce, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke Statement on
October 2010 U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services Report (Dec. 10, 2010)
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China’s exchange rate regime, in addition to warranting unilateral legislative action, is in
violation of WTO law.16
The Bretton Woods Institutions
The Bretton Woods Institutions were precisely created to address issues of global
economic imbalances, or externalities, created as a consequence of countries pursuing
unilateral trade policy objectives.17 The International Monetary Fund (IMF or the Fund),
for instance, is mandated to address trade imbalances caused by fundamentally
misaligned or manipulated exchange rates through its surveillance powers.18 To this end,
the IMF is concerned with the impacts of exchange rate policies on trade imbalances.19
By contrast, the WTO, which developed through the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), has as its overall function to reduce and eliminate measures that
restrain or distort the volume of international trade.

20

Arguably, exchange rate

manipulation that has an adverse effect on international trade volumes falls within the
competence of the organization, as evidenced by GATT Article XV(4).
Although there is a possible overlap between the jurisdictions of the two
organizations, in that both can be said to be concerned with the effects of member states’
exchange rate policies, two points bear emphasis. First, determining whether a state’s
exchange rate is in violation of an IMF or a WTO obligation evolves around different sets
of facts and considerations. A finding, therefore, that an exchange rate is “fundamentally
misaligned” or “manipulated” under IMF Article IV:1(iii) do not automatically establish
16

See witness statements and testimonies for the United States House Ways and Means
Committee Hearing on China’s Exchange Rate Policy (Mar. 24, 2010)
17
Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, supra note 10, p. 5
18
Art. IV IMF Rules
19
Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, supra note 10, p. 5
20
Id. p. 6
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a violation of GATT Article XV(4), or vice versa.21 Second, unlike the IMF, the WTO
has a formal dispute settlement mechanism, conferred with exclusive competence to
adjudicate issues relating to member states’ WTO commitments. Thus, taking into
consideration that every adverse WTO recommendation is coupled with a remedy
(compensation or multilaterally approved retaliatory action), 22 the WTO is by far the
most appealing forum in which to challenge China’s exchange rate policy.
Part III
Challenging the China Currency Issue in the WTO
As alluded to above, the dispute settlement procedure in the WTO provides for
one of the most effective dispute settlement procedures and enforcement mechanism in
international law. By virtue of Article XXIII of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU), the WTO enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member state
measure is consistent with WTO law. 23 An adverse recommendation of the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) normally results in the member state withdrawing the measure
concerned. In exceptional cases, the prevailing member is entitled to monetary
compensation or may be authorized to retaliate by suspending the application of
concessions or other obligations against the non-complying member state.24
The United States has three conceivable legal bases in the WTO Agreements,
pursuant to which it can challenge the undervalued Chinese currency. The RMB can
arguably be held to violate WTO law on the basis that: (a) it is a WTO illegal export

21

Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, supra note 10, pp. 7, 8
Art. 22.2 DSU
23
United States - Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, adopted December 22,
1999, para. 7.95 (Panel Report)
24
Art. 3.7 DSU
22
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subsidy;25 (b) it undermines the intent of the WTO;26 or (c) it is an exchange action that
frustrates the intent of the GATT.27
a.

Export Subsidization
The purpose of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM

Agreement) is to impose a multilateral discipline on the premise that some forms of
government intervention distort international trade, or have the potential to distort
international trade.28 The question is whether China’s practice of intervening in currency
markets to drive down the price of the RMB to enhance its export competitiveness
constitutes the proscribed act.
In order for there to be a subsidy, Article 1.1 SCM Agreement requires that the
governmental action either provides a “financial contribution” or “any income or price
support” which confers a “benefit” to the recipient. Furthermore, the SCM Agreement
requires that the benefit is specific so as to confer an advantage to a certain enterprise or
industry.29 It is, thus, a two-prong test qualified by the requirement of specificity that
determines whether a measure meets the internationally agreed definition of a subsidy in
the WTO treaty.30
i. Governmental Financial Contribution
The concept of a governmental financial contribution connotes a clear transfer of
economic resources to a national recipient. Article 1.1 SCM Agreement sets out an
exhaustive list identifying specific forms of governmental financial contributions that are
25

Arts. 1-3 WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
A so called “non-violation complaint” pursuant to Article XXIII GATT
27
Art. XV(4) GATT
28
Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted August 20,
1999, para 9.119 (Panel Report)
29
Art. 2 SCM Agreement
30
Canada - Aircraft, supra note 28, para 156
26
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deemed to distort international trade.31 Given the strict confines within which the term
operates, it is possible that a governmental financial contribution that is not among the
enumerated items in the provision is not held to be a WTO subsidy even though it
provides an economic benefit to a national industry.32
Former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body James Bacchus argues that the act
of the People’s Bank of China of selling units of RMB and obtaining, mainly, U.S.
dollars in an attempt to control the value of its exchange rate can be seen as an exercise of
China’s general regulatory powers.33 It is characterized by China’s participation in the
exchange markets, which does not generally involve a direct financial contribution to
national exporters. It can be argued in the alternative, however, that when China
intervenes and drives down the value of the RMB it impedes the inflow of imports and
thus “foregoes tariff revenue otherwise due”, which is also recognized as a financial
contribution in the SCM Agreement. 34 Moreover, in the instances where Chinese
exporters engage directly with the People’s Bank of China to exchange foreign currency
for RMB, a “direct transfer of funds” would most likely take place.35
ii. Advantage
According to Article 1 SCM Agreement, an advantage exists where the subsidy
provides value to the recipient. The fact that Chinese exporters can trade units of foreign
currency for RMBs at a discount of approximately 20-40%, equal the undervaluation,

31

United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, adopted
August 23, 2001 (Panel Report)
32
Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, supra note 10, p. 32
33
James Bacchus, A Survey of Views Regarding Whether Exchange-Rate Misalignment Is a
Countervailable, Prohibited Export Subsidy Under the Agreements of the World Trade Organization (April
2007), p. 2
34
Art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) SCM Agreement
35
Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, supra note 10, p. 32 ft. 65
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may be deemed as providing an advantage to the exporter. However, there is no
conclusive way of measuring the exact value of the advantage because there is no
currency-exchange market where the RMB is openly traded. In other words, the value of
the RMB is not determined by market forces of supply and demand, but rather by the
exclusive discretion of China. John Magnus, President of TradeWins LLC, Washington
D.C, argues that China’s currency regime can be seen as an exchange-risk program that
appears to shield Chinese exporters from the expense of hedging against foreignexchange losses or from purchasing guarantees to guard against exchange-rate fluctuation.
Arguably, this service comes at no cost to the exporter, and could be characterized as an
advantage valued at the amount equal to the cost of entering into an off-setting forex
position on any given day.36
iii. Specificity
The specificity requirement is intended to operate as a tool to limit the number of
governmental actions that can become subject to the WTO subsidy rules.37 Article 2.3
SCM Agreement states that the specificity requirement is met if the subsidy can be
characterized as an “export subsidy” – i.e. a subsidy contingent upon export performance.
China’s practice of intervening in currency exchange markets does not directly confer an
advantage to Chinese companies or industries contingent upon their export performance.
It is true that exporting firms tend to be the biggest beneficiaries of an undervalued
exchange rate, but it cannot conclusively be determined that the undervalued RMB is an
export subsidy merely because Chinese exporting firms tend to benefit the most. On the

36

ChinaCurrencyCoalition.com, A Survey of Views Regarding Whether Exchange-Rate
Misalignment Is a Countervailable, Prohibited Export Subsidy Under the Agreements of the World Trade
Organization (April 2007), pp. 6, 7
37
Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid (2009), p. 359
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contrary, the effects of the lower-valued RMB are felt throughout the whole Chinese
economy, which is short of satisfying the specificity requirement.
b. Non-Violation Complaint
The United States could bring a “non-violation” complaint, pursuant to GATT
Article XXIII, arguing that China’s exchange rate practice is not necessarily a violation
of a WTO commitment per se, but is prohibited because it undermines the intent of the
trade agreements. The benefit that otherwise would accrue to the United States derives
from the concession agreement China has reciprocally negotiated vis-à-vis the other
WTO member states. These agreements set out the specific bound tariff rates for goods
that are applied upon importation to a member state. Arguably, China is in violation of its
agreed tariff rates by maintaining an undervalued currency given that it impedes the
volume of imports due to the severely weakened purchasing power of Chinese consumers.
The de facto increase in tariffs, across-the-board for all imports, equals the extent of the
undervaluation, i.e. 20-40%. However, the evidentiary problem as to the exact amount of
undervaluation is an obvious obstacle for bringing a successful complaint forward.
Furthermore, a non-violation complaint suggests that a member state has adopted a new
policy action that undermines its WTO commitments. There is a formidable challenge for
any WTO member to argue that China’s exchange rate practice is one that it did not
exercise when it acceded the organization in 2001. Exchange rate policies are also
peculiar in the sense that no WTO member can legitimately expect another member to
maintain basically the same exchange rate policy that was in place when it joined the
multilateral organization, seeing that monetary policies are prone to change to meet

14

national economic concerns.38 In other words, exchange rate policies are by nature ill
suited to form the basis of a non-violation complaint.
c. Exchange Action Frustrating the Intent of GATT
GATT Article XV addresses currency exchange measures that undermine a
member state’s commitments under the GATT. The obligation most relevant for our
purposes is found in Article XV paragraph 4, which provides:39
Contracting Parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of
this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.

Article XV(4) shall be read in combination with the addenda to the paragraph, which in
relevant part provides:
The word ‘frustrate’ is intended to indicate, for example, that infringements of the letter
of any Article of this Agreement by exchange action shall not be regarded as a violation
of that Article if, in practice, there is no appreciable departure from the intent of the
Article.

The meaning and exact scope of Article XV(4) are fraught with uncertainties
because there is no jurisprudence on the provision since it has never been interpreted in
neither GATT nor WTO litigation. The scope of the article and the intention of the GATT
draftsmen have instead been extensively debated among scholars, whose views do not
necessarily converge. Aaditya Mattoo, Research Manager at the World Bank, and Arvind
Subramanian, Senior Research Staff at Peterson Institute for International Economics,
argue that Article XV(4) is too vague an obligation to provide a basis for effective

38

Dukgeun Ahn, Is the Contemporary Chinese Exchange Rate Regime “WTO-legal”? (2010), p. 4
In the event of a challenge, the WTO is required to consult with the IMF and accept all findings
presented by the Fund.
39
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enforcement against the Chinese currency misalignment and suggest that new rules have
to be adopted to this end.40 Stanford University Professors Robert W. Staiger and Alan O.
Sykes also seriously question the viability of such a challenge. Moreover, they also find a
claim asserting the undervalued RMB as comparable to an illegal export subsidy or
illegal import tariff to be non-viable. 41 However, arguing in the contrary, Jorge O.
Miranda, King & Spalding, concludes that Article XV(4) does provide a sufficient legal
basis for a challenge to be brought forwards and, more importantly, argues that the
prospect of a favorable outcome is reasonably attainable.42
When interpreting the WTO Agreements, WTO panels and the Appellate Body
must apply “the customary rules of interpretation of public international law”. 43 The
customary rules have been settled in WTO case law to be codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32. 44 The effect of these treaty
interpretative rules, for our purposes, is that Article XV(4) shall be interpreted based on
its ordinary meaning, context, and object and purpose, as well as with the aid of
supplementary means, such as the preparatory works of the GATT, if the ordinary
meaning of the provision remains ambiguous or obscure.

45

Applying the treaty

interpretative rules the question is whether China’s management of the value of the RMB
qualifies as an exchange action that frustrates, to an appreciable extent, the intent of the

40

Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth
Funds: A New Role for the World Trade Organization, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4668
(2008), p. 4
41
Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, supra note 10
42
Jorge O. Miranda, Currency Undervaluation as a Violation of GATT Article VX(4), p. 115, in
Simon J Evenett (ed.), The U.S.-Sino Currency Dispute: New Insights from Economics, Politics, and Law
(2010)
43
Art. 3.2 DSU
44
United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R,
adopted April 29, 1996, p. 17 (Appellate Body Report)
45
Jorge O. Miranda, supra note 42, p. 119
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GATT?
i. Exchange Action46
Since Article XV(4) only refers to “exchange action” and not “exchange-rate
policies” or “exchange-rate management” per se, the interpretative challenge is whether
these terms nevertheless fall within the meaning of “exchange action”. First, the ordinary
meaning of “action” does not conclusively settle whether “policies” or “management” are
included or excluded in the term. Second, the context of the provision suggests that the
GATT draftsmen intended for the term to be given a broader meaning, because in
neighboring provisions they have utilized much narrower terms, such as “exchange
controls” and “multiple exchange rates”. Third, the object and purpose of Article XV can
reasonably be said to prevent member states from impeding or hindering in any way the
free flow of international trade by virtue of exchange rate practices. Furthermore,
Professor John H. Jackson, with reference to the preparatory works of the GATT,
suggests that “exchange-rate policies” were something the GATT draftsmen did indeed
intend to fall within the broader term of “exchange action”.47 It is therefore conceivable
that China’s monetary practice satisfy the first legal requirement.
ii. Frustrates
The ordinary meaning of the verb “to frustrate”, with reference to the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary, includes “prevent”, “counteract” or “make ineffectual”. In
other words, the exchange action has to impede or otherwise make ineffectual the intent
of the GATT. As such, the undervalued RMB restricts trade volumes seeing that it has
46

This section relies on the article of Jorge O. Miranda, supra note 42, pp. 119, 120, which in
material part coincides with my interpretation of GATT Article XV(4).
47
John H. Jackson, World Trade Law and the Law of GATT (1969), p. 479
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similar effects as an import tariff and export subsidy.
iii. The Intent of the GATT
The exchange action, also, has to frustrate the intent of the GATT, which most
reasonably ought to be interpreted as frustrating a provision of the GATT as opposed to
the agreement as a whole. A member state’s concession agreement forms part of the
GATT by virtue of Article II(7) and, as argued above, the fact that China maintains an
undervalued exchange rate is equivalent to an import tariff and, therefore, in violation of
one of its commitments under the GATT.
In conclusion, the interpretation of Article XV(4) set forth above lends itself for a
finding that China’s exchange rate practice is an “exchange action” in violation of WTO
law, because it makes ineffectual (frustrates) the bound tariff rates China has negotiated
vis-à-vis other member states (intent of GATT). However, a word of caution is warranted.
The fact that the DSB has not adopted an official interpretation of Article XV(4) does
mean that there is great uncertainty as to its scope. Hence, the interpretation set forth is
but a mere qualitative guess. Furthermore, the fact that there are inherent uncertainties
and evidentiary problems with respect to bringing a challenge against China’s exchange
rate practice under all three legal bases in the WTO Agreements ought to make the
United States government to hesitate before lodging a formal complaint. The
uncertainties and evidentiary obstacles serves as strong evidence that matters of exchange
rate policies are not sensu stricto within the competence of the WTO. Moreover, the fact
that no member states’ exchange rate practices have ever been challenged in either GATT
or WTO litigation is, a fortiori, another piece of evidence that ought to deter the United
States from bringing a formal complaint.

18

Part IV
The viability of bringing a successful challenge in the WTO against China’s
exchange rate practice is, at best, only reasonably attainable for the United States.
Notwithstanding the vagueness and evidentiary obstacles in bringing a case, there are
additional factors that make WTO litigation unsuitable. This part of the paper attempts to
illuminate some of these. They are not set out in any hierarchical order of importance.
“One of Those Big Trade Cases”
The WTO dispute settlement system has, rightfully so, been acknowledged and
accredited for providing an effective mechanism for the resolution of international trade
disputes. Since its inception in 1995, the DSB has adopted approximately 166 panel
reports and 96 appellate body reports, covering a broad range of topics in international
trade.48 It is not equally clear, however, whether the WTO can be deemed to have had the
same success in adjudicating the so called “big trade cases”. To this subjectively
categorized group belong disputes such as EC – Bananas,49 EC - Hormones50 and the still
ongoing Boeing/Airbus51 cases. These disputes stand out because they did not exclusively
concern differences on mere trade issues, rather the disagreements delved into complex
issues that went deep into social and economic structures of the member states involved.
The common denominator of these disputes, in other words, is the considerably high
political and economic stakes at play that made WTO litigation both unsuitable and
ineffective.
48
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In EC - Hormones, the United States challenged measures of the EC that banned
the importation of beef from animals produced with hormones to stimulate growth. The
EC argued that the measures were justified because they were based on a sound scientific
basis, as required by the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS Agreement),
showing an identifiable risk to human health from the use of hormones for growth
purposes in beef cattle.52 The argument of the EC was tenuous, but sought to protect
widely held societal values in the EC that disapproved of such practices. On appeal, the
appellate body found in favor of the United States, holding the EC measures out to be
inconsistent with the SPS Agreement.53 However, it is not surprising that the EC, due to
the domestic political constraints, did not lift the ban and allowed for the importation of
hormone-treated beef. Instead, it accepted the adverse ruling authorizing the United
States to impose retaliatory tariffs amounting to US$116.8 million a year, equal the level
of damage to U.S. producers. The case evidences that in some instances deep-seated
societal values and political considerations will trump the legal obligations imposed on
member states by the global trading system.
In a similar vein, the China currency issue is more than a mere trade issue.
Arguably, it is a completely different animal. National monetary policies are the
prerogative of a sovereign state. A state has the inherent and exclusive power to freely
control and manage the value of its currency. In adherence to the doctrine of comity, no
other state shall sit in judgment of that power. Thus, even though China’s exchange rate
policy inevitably has trade volume implications, it is above all an exercise of a sovereign
prerogative that is beyond reach of the rules and dispute settlement system of the WTO.
52
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To have the issue adjudicated pursuant to the trade rules would not only produce an
unsatisfactorily outcome but it would also pose serious risks and consequences to the
future success of the dispute settlement system.
For instance, such a case could set a dangerous precedent for expansive
interpretation of vague WTO provisions, and considerably broaden the trade
organization’s authority through judicial activism. 54 How far would the trade regime
extend its reach into other controversial areas with undeniable trade implications such as
labor, environment, competition, and investment? Although the question is beyond the
scope of this paper, suffice it to say there is a correlation between the success of the WTO
dispute settlement system and the narrow scope of trade issues it is, and has, concerned
itself with. Delineating how far the trade regime shall delve into these peripheral and
politically charged areas should not be left with the dispute settlement system to decide.
With reference to the doctrine of separation of powers, the decision should be vested with
the WTO General Council (the executive) or decided in WTO trade negotiation rounds
(the legislator), but not the judiciary.55 It is important to emphasis that the WTO treaty
recognizes that there are limits to what the dispute settlement system can deliver. In
Article 3.7 DSU, WTO members are encouraged to exercise judgment as to whether
bringing a formal complaint would be fruitful. Taking account of the considerations
aforementioned, it is not unwarranted to suggest that the WTO dispute settlement system
is not a suitable forum for the China currency issue.
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Not an Effective Remedy
If the United States would nevertheless forego the appeal of the WTO to exercise
judgment, as prescribed in Article 3.7 DSU, and submit a formal complaint there are
concerns that a recommendation by the DSB would not provide an effective remedy to
the China currency issue.
As a preliminary matter, it is by no means certain that the outcome of a case
would yield a win for the United States. The viability of a challenge has been examined
at some length above. However, one final point is warranted. The fact that the United
States may not prevail carries the profound risk of handing a mightily big victory to the
Chinese; which in effect would vindicate its exchange rate practice. An unfavorable
outcome for the United States would, therefore, result in a significant loss of leverage and
make it a great deal more difficult to successfully address the issue thereafter.
Second, in view of the subject matter of the issue it is likely that a dispute would
be a long, drawn-out proceeding that ultimately would fail to provide an effective remedy
to an immediate problem. Notwithstanding that Article 20 DSU foresees a maximum
duration of nine to twelve months for the DSB to adopt a report, experience from the so
called “big trade cases” suggest that the actual duration of a WTO proceeding would be
considerably longer. For example, in EC - Bananas it took the DSB five years to adopt
the final recommendation, in EC - Hormones the time period was three years, while in
the first Boeing/Airbus dispute the DSB adopted the panel report more than five years
after the United States’ request to establish a panel. Moreover, the panel report in
Boeing/Airbus was appealed and is currently under Appellate Body review, which will
further add to the longevity of the dispute.
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In regards to the China currency issue, there is nothing suggesting that it would be
resolved within the short time frame foreseen by Article 20 DSU. Rather a proceeding is
more likely to be protracted with years of appeals and attracting other WTO members
either as co-complainants or interested third parties.56 The fact that a WTO proceeding,
therefore, would most likely last for several years is yet another reason why WTO
litigation is not the best option for the United States, seeing that the forum will fail to
provide an effective remedy to an immediate problem that needs to be redressed sooner
rather than later.
Third, it is also by no means certain that China would comply with an adverse
WTO recommendation. Notwithstanding that compliance with DSB recommendations
have been a particular strength of the WTO dispute settlement system,57 compliance is a
political calculation taking into consideration the political and economic importance of
the particular issue at stake. 58 Therefore, there is greater risk of member state
noncompliance in cases where political and economic stakes are particularly high. In the
case of China, the lower-valued exchange rate generates substantial employment
opportunities to its vast population, which serves the grander goal of the Chinese
Communist Party namely: political stability. The fact that China’s export competitiveness
is an emanation of the higher societal goal of limiting social unrest with China’s political
system makes a revaluation of the RMB inconceivable.
Fourth, in the event China would be in noncompliance with a DSB
recommendation, the question is whether the United States’ right to employ retaliatory
56
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tariffs, as prescribed in Article 22.4 DSU, would provide an effective remedy.59 Although
the impositions of retaliatory tariffs on Chinese imports would go some way in providing
a remedy, it would not be effective. The United States has on several occasions been
authorized to implement retaliatory tariff measures, including against the (now) European
Union in EC - Bananas and EC – Hormones respectively. In the former, retaliatory tariffs
amounting to US$191.4 million a year has been applied since 1999 without ever
successfully obtaining the European Union’s full compliance with the DSB
recommendation.60 In the latter case, the United States and the European Union have as
of 2009 reached a provisional agreement on a way forward in the EC – Hormones dispute.
Under the agreement, the United States will maintain current retaliatory measures of
US$116.8 million a year until 2013, during which period of time the EU will agree to
provide additional duty-free access to the EU market for beef not treated with growthpromoting hormones.61 In other words, even though the EU has agreed to concede greater
market access to U.S. beef exports it will still be noncompliant with the DSB
recommendation since the ban on hormone-treated beef subsists.
Based on the foregoing, the fact of the matter is that retaliation is not always an
effective means to obtain counterparty compliance - at least not when the counterparty is
a large economic power. It is apparent that retaliation would equally be without teeth
against China in inducing a revaluation of the RMB, given that pecuniary retaliation
would not carry much force on the world’s second largest economy and the country with
59
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the world’s deepest currency reserves. There are of course additional consequences
flowing from having an adverse DSB recommendation made against China. It could
serve the United States with a powerful negotiation instrument, as well as it could have
harmful effects on China’s reputation, affecting relations with its trading partners. 62
However, the question remains whether these effects are tantamount to an effective
remedy to United States’ immediate problem? I think not.
Is There a Better Option?
There are a number of options available for the United States to try and force
China to revalue its currency. Apart from WTO litigation two others have been briefly
mentioned in this paper, namely unilateral trade legislation, currently in the form of a
House of Representatives’ bill, authorizing countervailing import duties against the
export subsidies created by the undervalued RMB and, second, IMF ad hoc consultation.
Moreover, the United States can seek to have the Group of 20 (G-20) or the WTO
adopting guidelines/rules compelling states with persistent current account surpluses to
adjust or, alternatively, implementing restrictions on exchange rate management.63 The
United States can also engage in so called “remedial intervention”, as foreseen by Senate
bill 3134, whereby the United States would proactively intervene in currency markets to
offset China’s intervention on any given day.64 Finally, the U.S. Treasury can designate
China as a “currency manipulator” in its bi-annual report to Congress on foreign
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exchange practices.65
Whether these additional options are more suitable than WTO litigation to have
China revalue the RMB is open to discussion, seeing that each comes with clear
advantages and disadvantages. Whatever option the United States chooses to employ, it is
imperative that it is multilateral in nature in order to have the greatest effects. China is far
more likely to respond to the criticism of a coalition of countries as opposed to bilateral
pressure from the United States alone.66 Notwithstanding that a multilateral solution to
the issue does not seem attainable in the short-term, in fact the G-20 stalemate might even
have intensified the feud over currencies,67 the unilateral methods of trade legislation, i.e.
remedial intervention and designation of China as currency manipulator, would run the
risk of seriously aggravating the situation by seeing the escalation of beggar-thy-neighbor
policies and the ultimate risk of an all out bilateral trade war.
Conclusion
It has been argued in this paper that there is, at least, a reasonable chance for the
United States to bring a successful challenge against China’s undervalued RMB in the
dispute settlement system of the WTO. It has equally been shown that such route would
most likely fail to provide an effective remedy to an immediate problem. This is not to
say, however, that a favorable outcome would be without any benefit to the United States.
A successful challenge could be of considerable leverage in bilateral negotiations, which
is a forum more likely to produce a sustainable settlement of the issue as opposed to
65
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embarking upon the adversarial route and WTO litigation.
In answering the question that was posed in the beginning of this paper, whether
the fact that the United States has not lodged a formal complaint with the WTO dispute
settlement system is evidence of the trade organization’s demise from effectively
resolving member state disputes, the answer is in the negative. The global trade regime,
as embodied by the WTO, has always only concerned itself with a narrow category of
measures that affect international trade volumes. The competence of the trade
organization is ultimately what the member states have agreed to in treaty. The DSB has,
painfully at times, sought to honor the intention of the member states by adopting a strict
textual interpretation of the WTO Agreements when adjudicating disputes. Since neither
exchange rate policies nor exchange rate management are explicitly referred to in the
WTO Agreements, it is evidence that the matter shall not, without further clarification of
the member states, fall within the jurisdiction of the DSB. If a challenge, nevertheless,
would be brought forward pursuant to tenuous legal bases in the WTO Agreements it
would come at the risk of being unsatisfactorily resolved. Moreover, taking into
consideration that the issue also involves considerably high political and economic stakes,
compliance with a DSB recommendation becomes, a fortiori, even less likely.
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